

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Cadigan, Cornelius

**DIN:** 17-A-3070

**Facility:** Washington CF

**AC No.:** 07-003-19 B

**Findings:** (Page 1 of 3)

---

Appellant challenges the June 2019 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing a hold to the maximum expiration date. The instant offenses involve the appellant trying to break into a laundry machine while wearing a mask and breaking open a MoneyCard machine in a different laundry room a few days later. In a separate incident, Appellant boarded a [REDACTED] bus and stated, “I have a bomb and it’s going to explode with everyone on the bus.” Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Commissioner stating that Appellant’s family will “now suffer” implied that the Board rendered a decision before the end of the interview; 2) the interview was conducted in a condescending manner and offered few opportunities for Appellant to argue or answer; 3) the Board did not consider Appellant’s release plans including potential employment; and 4) the Board improperly considered his history of drug use. These arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, **and** that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society **and** will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).

While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000). Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 1997). The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1<sup>st</sup> Dept. 2007). In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4<sup>th</sup> Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881.

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Cadigan, Cornelius

**DIN:** 17-A-3070

**Facility:** Washington CF

**AC No.:** 07-003-19 B

**Findings:** (Page 2 of 3)

---

The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered the appropriate factors, including: the instant offenses involving breaking and attempting to break into two different laundry machines on separate occasions and falsely claiming that he had a bomb on a bus, causing passengers to panic and flee; institutional record including Tier III tickets for drug use and an unhygienic act/urinalysis test, SHU time, [REDACTED], and completion of ART; and release plans to live with his wife and return to work as a building engineer. The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, the case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and the sentencing minutes.

After considering all required factors, the Board acted within its discretion in determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the instant offenses, that they are a continuation of Appellant's criminal record, and Appellant's poor institutional record. See Matter of Boccadisi v. Stanford, 133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015); Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Almonte v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 145 A.D.3d 1307, 42 N.Y.S.3d 691 (3d Dept. 2016), *lv. denied*, 29 N.Y.3d 905 (2017); Matter of Karlin v. Cully, 104 A.D.3d 1285, 1286, 960 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (4th Dept. 2013).

Appellant's assertion that a decision was already rendered before the end of the interview is without merit. There is no evidence the Board's decision was predetermined. Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). The record reveals the Commissioner in fact stated, "It's unfortunate that your kids are probably suffering more than you are" (Tr. at 10.) in the present tense and in reference to Appellant's established criminal behavior.

Appellant's contention that the interview was conducted in a condescending manner and offered few opportunities for him to argue or answer is also without merit. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative fact-finders. See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992). The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 1371 (2000). The transcript as a whole does not support Appellant's contention that the parole interview was conducted improperly or that he was denied a fair interview. Matter of Rivers v. Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Mays v. Stanford, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502, 150 A.D.3d 1521 (3d

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

**APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION**

**Name:** Cadigan, Cornelius

**DIN:** 17-A-3070

**Facility:** Washington CF

**AC No.:** 07-003-19 B

**Findings:** (Page 3 of 3)

---

Dept. 2017); Matter of Bonilla v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 32 A.D.3d 1070, 1071, 820 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (3d Dept. 2006). Inasmuch as Appellant now complains about the scope of the interview, the nature and extent of a parole interview are solely within the discretion of the Board. Matter of Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 28-29, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704, 710 (1969).

Finally, the Board may consider an inmate's history of drug and/or alcohol abuse. Matter of Espinal v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 172 A.D.3d 1816, 100 N.Y.S.3d 777 (3d Dept. 2019); Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Sanchez v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1249, 801 N.Y.S.2d 423 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Llull v. Travis, 287 A.D.2d 845, 846, 731 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (3d Dept. 2001).

**Recommendation:** Affirm.